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Resumen: El objetivo de este trabajo es rastrear y articular el concepto de 
materialismo histórico, así como su relación con otros conceptos tales como 
política, teología y progreso, en los principales textos histórico-filosóficos de 
Benjamin. El marco teórico del trabajo es analítico-descriptivo. 
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Abstract: The aim of this work is to trace and formulate the concept of historical 
materialism, and its relationship with politics, theology and progress, in Benjamin’s 
historical-philosophical texts. The work’s theoretical framework is analytic-
descriptive. 
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Walter Benjamin’s theses On the Concept of History (1) promise a 
discussion on a new concept of history, and concomitantly on a new concept 
of the present. A characteristic of the text is that at the center of it there is 
no discursive explanation, but an image instead. Benjamin’s concept of 
history seems to do away with philosophy’s conceptual games, and 
transforms concepts into images, which spoil the promise of truth offered 
by philosophy of history. For Benjamin, the traditional concepts of history 
evaporated as he wrote the historical-philosophical theses. He could no 
longer be convinced that every historical event derives from a linear cause 
and effect relationship, and that all events together constitute a progressive, 
continuous motion. In thesis IX this appears as “one single catastrophe, 
which keeps pilling wreckage upon wreckage,” the “pile of debris” was so 
vast that it even “grows toward the sky.” According to Benjamin, everything 
about history has been untimely, sorrowful and unsuccessful. History has 
collapsed into a “single catastrophe” in which the history of mankind has 
shown to be a failure. The basis for Benjamin’s image of the pile of debris 
reaching to the sky, and the catastrophic concept of history in these theses, 
goes beyond concepts and phrases. For Benjamin, the stigma of 
philosophical language is that it does not extend to mimesis - 
remembrance. Only images attempt to gain direct access to mimesis.  
The image of thesis IX presents history as Benjamin himself 
understood it, but we still have to grasp what he hides behind that image: 
“There is a picture by Klee called Angelus Novus. It shows an angel who 
seems about to move away from something he stares at. His eyes are wide, 
his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how the angel of history 
must look.” The image is an allegory of history as natural history. And the 
 
 
Astrolabio. Revista internacional de filosofía 
2010. Núm. 10. ISSN 1699-7549. pp. 126-131 
 
 126 
angel stands for the “true” historian, the “historical materialist” who has 
stripped himself of all illusion about human history. In order to use the 
“weak messianic power” bestowed on us “like every generation that 
preceded us,” we must perceive history from a materialistic point of view, 
that is, history as the catastrophic pile of debris that continually “grows 
toward the sky.” The historical materialist understands the “claim” implicit 
in accepting this power: “a power on which the past has a claim” (thesis II). 
“The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has 
been smashed.” Here Benjamin seems to pave the way for the construction 
of a new “conception of the present as now-time” (thesis XVIII, A).  
It is plausible to contend that Benjamin was aware of the 
explosiveness of historical materialism, which lay in the concept of the 
incompleteness of the past. In the theses, Benjamin refers to the “past” or 
“what has been” in general, and in some passages, to “past generations,” the 
“tradition of the oppressed”, and finally, to the dead and the smashed. 
Benjamin is not writing history, but developing a new “concept” of history.  
No one more emphatically integrated the incompleteness of history 
into its completeness than Marx did. In the Eighteenth Brumaire (2) he 
wrote: “The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on 
the brain of the living.” For past revolutions, there might have been some 
sense in “awaken the dead”, but for the revolution —that Marx thought was 
imminent— “in order to arrive at its own content” --its own identity-- it 
“must let the dead bury their dead.” In the same line of thinking, 
Horkheimer asserted: “The determination of incompleteness is idealistic if 
completeness is not comprised within it. Past injustice has occurred and is 
completed. The slain are really slain….” (See, Horkheimer’s letter of March 
16, 1937). But Benjamin inveighs against this, and thus he holds his position 
in a celebrated passage from the Arcades Project (3): 
 
History is not simply a science but also and not least a form a 
remembrance. What science has “determined,” 
remembrance can modify. Such mindfulness can make the 
incomplete (happiness) into something complete, and the 
complete (suffering) into something incomplete [N8,1]. 
  
Succeeding generations cannot simply ratify the fact that what has been lost 
has been lost for all time, and that the dead have no more access to any 
praxis, for other praxis is within reach. Thus the history written by the 
historical materialist takes up a certain “idea of the past” as its cause.  
If “the idea of redemption” is inherent to the “idea of happiness,” the 
same should hold true for the idea of the past. “The past carries with it a 
secret index by which it is referred to redemption.” But Benjamin does not 
assign the task of redemption to a redeemer who is to intervene in history 
from the outside; he also maintains like Marx wrote, “men make their own 
history.” Benjamin thereby renders the past of history its completeness. 
“There is a secret agreement between past generations and the present one. 
Then our coming was expected on earth.” Although all this may sound 
theological, it has a materialistic intent and content. It is the historical 
materialist who is “aware” that “the past has a claim” on us, and we will not 
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“settle” this claim “cheaply.” Benjamin does not depend on messianic 
promises: “Like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed 
with a weak messianic power.” That “messianic power” is an impulse, a 
promise that does not turn it into a fetish of what it promises.  
How this power with which mankind is endowed is to be put to 
work? Benjamin does not treat this question in the theses. But he has no 
doubts about who is to put it to work - the historical materialist. In thesis II, 
Benjamin outlines the task of the historical materialist, and in thesis XVII, 
he describes the procedure. Benjamin first provides a summary of 
“materialistic historiography,” under which he subsumes his works: it “is 
based on a constructive principle. Thinking involves not only the movement 
of thoughts, but their arrest as well.” The “movement of thoughts” seems to 
stand beside “their arrest.” This shows Benjamin’s characteristic form of 
philosophizing, which uses “dialectical images” to decode profane existence 
as the enigmatic form of something beyond existence. Benjamin also 
combined these ideas in the paradoxical formulation “dialectics at a 
standstill.” His insistence on the arrest of the flow of thoughts opposes 
Hegel’s dialectics. Benjamin does not seek to assimilate itself into the 
temporal course of history through understanding or intuition. The 
knowledge —exposed by the arrest of the movement— “flashes up at the 
moment of its recognizability” (thesis V): 
  
Where thinking suddenly comes to a stop in a configuration 
saturated with tensions, it gives that constellation a shock, by 
which thinking is crystallizes as a monad. The historical 
materialist approaches a historical object only where it 
confronts him as a monad (thesis XVII). 
  
This representation is  a  construction that distills the rational shape out of 
the tensions of history. Benjamin’s method seems to be an optical change: 
the lenses in the historical camera have been replaced. In order to grasp the 
movement of history, the flow must come to a stop. It must crystallize into a 
shape and be constructed as something immediately present. Regarding the 
historical subject, Benjamin writes: “In this structure he recognizes the sign 
of a messianic arrest of happening.” By virtue of his “constructive 
principle,” by means of this “shock” which he gives to history, the historical 
materialist causes it to crystallize into a monad, bringing about the “arrest 
of happening.” Like Marx, Benjamin also recognizes the sign of “a 
revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past,” by virtue of this 
“messianic” arrest.  
In other words, thesis XVII deals with the chance of historical 
materialism to gain possession of history as a unity subject-object, which 
crystallizes itself by means of an “arrest” into a monad. In thesis VI, this 
cessation is more precisely described as “a moment of danger”: historical 
materialism wishes to retain that image of the past, which appears to man, 
single out by history at a moment of danger. This danger is the political one 
“of becoming a tool of the ruling classes.” Benjamin accepts the cause of the 
oppressed as his own: “Every age must strive anew to wrest tradition away 
from the conformism that is working to overpower it.” The “tradition” 
 
 
Astrolabio. Revista internacional de filosofía 
2010. Núm. 10. ISSN 1699-7549. pp. 126-131 
 
 128 
becomes then a “tool of the ruling classes” if it is abandoned to 
“conformism,” and all that because under capitalism the social relations are 
determined in the same way as commodities. The task of the historical 
materialist is to wrest tradition away from the ruling classes. As an 
explanation of this task, thesis VI continues with this sentence: “The 
Messiah comes not only as the redeemer, he comes as the victor over of 
Antichrist.” The introduction of these theological concepts cannot disguise 
the fact that there is no thought in the religious sense. While the Messiah is 
an image for the historical materialist, the Antichrist is an image for the 
“ruling classes.”  
Benjamin’s language in the historical-philosophical theses invokes 
anew the theological origin of Marxian concepts; the secularized content of 
these ideas is always maintained. The Messiah, redemption, the angel and 
the Antichrist appear in the theses as images, analogies and parables --not 
literally. Here the question is why Benjamin proceeds in this manner. 
Maybe, the metaphorical emphasis of Benjamin’s thought leads us to 
assume that he is playing a game. What then are the rules of this game?  
On thesis I, Benjamin offers us an image and its interpretation as 
well: 
 
There was once, we know, an automaton constructed in such 
a way that it could respond to every move by a chess player 
with a countermove that would ensure the winning of the 
game. A puppet wearing Turkish attire and with a hookah in 
its mouth sat before a chessboard placed on a large table. A 
system of mirrors created the illusion that this table was 
transparent on all sides. Actually, a hunchbacked dwarf --
master at chess-- sat inside and guided the puppet’s hand by 
means of strings.  
 
But Benjamin adds to the interpretation of the image his own interpretation 
of the figures: 
  
One can imagine a philosophic counterpart to this apparatus. 
The puppet, called “historical materialism,” is to win all the 
time. It can easily be a match for anyone if it enlists the 
services of theology, which today, as we know, is small and 
ugly and has to keep out of sight. 
  
How then do the dwarf and the puppet, theology and historical materialism, 
relate to one another? It seems that historical materialism and theology, 
which is the impulse that sets the apparatus of historical materialism, are 
by no means identical. There is no identity between the separate figures. 
But it is the dwarf (theology) who guides the puppet’s hand (historical 
materialism).  
In Benjamin’s interpretation, these relationships seem to be shifted. 
Historical materialism is in control: it “enlists the services of theology.” 
Theology is the slave who must do the work. Of course, the tasks 
undertaken by theology are not prescribed to it; on the contrary, it is the 
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expert. But it can only do anything when it is in the interest of its master. 
The master-slave relationship is reversed: the living dwarf does not “enlist 
the service” of the lifeless puppet. This reduces the living being to a mere 
object of domination and reveals “the puppet” to be, in reality, alive and 
active.  
Although the two figures are clearly separated, they become unified, 
however, when they make up the image of the automatic chess player. Only 
when theology and historical materialism have joined forces can the game 
begin. Only as allies would the two be a match for any opponent on the field 
of history —the class struggle. It seems that Benjamin seeks a form of 
cooperation between historical materialism and theology in which they can 
do more than take up the struggle - they can win. There can be no doubt 
about the desired outcome of the class struggle for one who has taken up 
the position of the oppressed classes. But is not it a solely intentional 
standpoint. Benjamin might respond to the question: if historical 
materialism “enlists the services of theology”, the victory of the oppressed 
classes must be objectively produced. Historical materialism “is to win all 
the time.”  
But this question necessarily raises the problem concerning the 
necessary conditions for winning the historical match. At this point, 
Benjamin implicitly departs from the discussion of the concept of history to 
the possible historical praxis. Benjamin’s historical materialism would 
postulate the unity of theory and practice as has been advocated since 
Marx. He attempts to develop the theory of a different practice, which 
might have a chance of winning the match. Indeed this seems to be the 
intention of the historical-philosophical theses.  
Historical materialism once sought to realize philosophy by 
transforming it. But in the meantime, for Benjamin, it has lost its 
relationship to reality. So in order to be able to catch up with real history 
again, historical materialism must return beyond philosophy to theology. 
But the question remains: Was Benjamin’s attempt successful? Is the 
alliance of historical and theology actually able to produce a new unity of 
theory and practice? 
Benjamin’s theses closely connect the theory of historiography –
narrative-- with the theory of history –the nature and transformation of 
human society-- in the same way in which history itself is referred to its 
political praxis. For Benjamin, it is necessary to have a certain conception 
of the present that allows us to generate an interrelationship between 
history and politics. The concept of history intended by Benjamin is meant 
to improve our position in the class struggle and historical materialism in 
the process. He immediately begins to develop the conception of an 
alternate political praxis, which would pursue the cause of historical 
materialism.  
Benjamin’s critical revision of the theory and practice of historical 
materialism has its starting point as a “criticism of the concept of progress 
itself” (thesis XIII). Its theory and practice have been formed by a 
conception of progress, which “bore little relation to reality but made 
dogmatic claims” (loc. cit.). Here Benjamin criticizes a vulgar historical 
materialism that “recognizes only the progress in mastering nature, not the 
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retrogression of society” (thesis XI). The vulgar-historical materialist 
bypasses the question that the concept of “progress” and the notion of 
“barbarism” are two sides of one and the same thing. Therefore, the task of 
historical materialism is “to brush history against the grain” (thesis VII).   
It would be a mistake to understand that Benjamin is against 
progress; he is against that man internalizes the logic of progress, and in 
this way he would indefinitely reproduce it. When the progress turns into 
the objective of mankind and not mankind the objective of progress, we 
reproduce a conformist and reified conception of history. In other words, 
the task of historical materialism then is to blast out the continuum of 
historical succession, that is, to overcome the concept of “progress.” 
Benjamin adopts a conception of history as discontinuity, as interruption.  
 “Historical materialism aspires to neither a homogeneous nor a 
continuous exposition of history” [N7a,2], rather it “leads the past to bring 
the present into a critical state” [N7a,5]. The critical momentum of 
historical materialism “is registered in that blasting of historical continuity” 
[N10a,1]. Benjamin writes: 
  
The concept of progress had to run counter to the critical 
theory of history [historical materialism] from the moment it 
ceased to be applied as criterion to the specific historical 
developments and instead was required to measure the span 
between a legendary inception and a legendary end of 
history…as soon it becomes the signature of historical 
process as a whole, the concept of progress bespeaks an 
uncritical hypostatization rather than a critical interrogation 
[N13,1]. 
  
For  Benjamin,  historical  materialism “carries along with it an immanent 
critique of the concept of progress” [N11,4]. So it must liquidate the 
continuum of history: it “blasts out ‘the reified’ continuity of history” 
[N9a,6], and constructs it as a discontinuum. That is, historical materialism 
does not reconstruct history by repeating the past, but constructing its 
“interferences” in the present. Its “founding concept is not progress but 
actualization” [N2,2].  
Benjamin attempts to establish “the discontinuity of historical time” 
as the foundations of the materialistic view of history. This attempt 
terminates in the concept of history as a “catastrophe”. The catastrophe is 
the continuum of history. For Benjamin, catastrophe is progress; progress 
is catastrophe. Thereby, “the concept of progress must be grounded in the 
idea of catastrophe. That things are ‘status quo’ is the catastrophe” [N9a,1]. 
That things continue on going is the catastrophe.  
However, Benjamin postulates a true concept of progress versus its 
reified version: “Progress has its seat not in the continuity of elapsing time 
but in its interferences” [N9a,7]. That is, in its discontinuities. These 
discontinuities are no less than the outcome of the aporias, the historical 
contradictions, of the present. In short, the task of historical materialism is 
to construct an alternative history once it “has annihilated within itself the 
[reified] idea of progress” [N2,2]. 
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1. Quotations originate from Walter Benjamin, On the Concept of History, 
in Selected Writings, vol. 4, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, 
trans. Edmund Jephcott et al., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2003).  
  
2. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Selected 
Writings, ed. David McLellan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
  
3. Quotations in brackets are from Walter Benjamin, Arcades Project, trans. 
Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1999). 
 
